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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GREGORY N. OLIVER,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 890625-CA
Priority No. 2

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

INTRODUCTION
Mr. Oliver requests rehearing of this case.

See Brown v.

Pickard. 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886)(explaining circumstances allowing
rehearing); Cumminas v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913)(same).
A copy of the Oliver opinion is in Appendix 1.

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD REASSESS THE DUE PROCESS ISSUE
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RECORD OF THIS CASE.
The Oliver opinion's discussion of the due process issue
omits the actual basis of the motion for continuance—trial
counsel's plain and broad admission:
I didn't do any formal trial preparation that I
normally do for a trial such as this, and
consequently, I am not prepared to proceed to
trial.
(T. 4 ) .
Oliver proceeds to set forth the following standards under
which to evaluate the motion for continuance in this case:

When moving for a continuance, a party must
show that denial of the motion will prevent the
party from obtaining material and admissible
evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks
can be produced within a reasonable time, and
that it has exercised due diligence in preparing
for the case before requesting the continuance,
Oliver at 3, citing State v. Linden. 761 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1988).
The Linden standards relied on in Oliver are inapposite to
this case because those standards are designed for the evaluation of
motions for continuances based on the need to obtain testimony from
absent witnesses.

See Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, at 1387 (explaining

that the defense motion to continue based on the need to procure the
testimony of out of state witnesses did not meet the Creviston
standards); State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah
1982)(setting forth standards for continuance motions based on the
need for testimony of absent witnesses).
The basis for the continuance motion in this case was that
trial counsel had done no formal trial preparation and was not
prepared to proceed (T. 4). Thus, there was no obligation for
counsel to meet the Linden/Creviston standards for continuances
needed to obtain the testimony of absent witnesses.

Further,

because trial counsel had done no formal trial preparation (T. 4),
he was in no position to identify material and admissible evidence,
or to demonstrate*, that any additional witnesses could be produced
within a reasonable time.
When the trial court learned that trial counsel had done no
formal trial preparation and was not prepared to go to trial,
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regardless of why that was the case, the trial court should have
recognized that Mr. Oliver's right to due process of law was at
stake, and granted the continuance.
P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983).

E.g. Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669

Mr. Oliver's apparent vacillation during the

plea bargaining process should not have been punished with the
sacrifice of his due process rights.

Cf. State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d

703 (Utah 1985)(defendant's appeal was improperly dismissed after he
escaped; his escape should not have been punished through the
forfeiture of his right to appeal).

While the trial court had the

power to discipline any violation of the court's order for timely
trial preparation, the trial court should not have sacrificed
Mr. Oliver's due process rights to a prepared defense against the
criminal charges.

See Robinson v. City Court for City of Ocrden, 185

P.2d 256, 258 (Utah 1947)(the purpose of contempt statutes "is to
protect litigants and the public from the mischievous danger of an
unfree and coerced tribunal.").
In assessing the prejudice resulting from the denial of the
motion for continuance, the Oliver opinion states,
We are also persuaded by Washington precedent,
that on appeal, the moving party must show that
it was materially prejudiced by the court's
denial of the continuance or that the trial
result would have been different had the
continuance been granted.
Oliver at 4 (emphasis added), citing State v. Barker. 667 P.2d 108,
114 (Wash. App. 1983).
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The Oliver paraphrase of the Washington standard stems from
dicta in Barker, and is worded more stringently than the actual
Washington standard set forth in the Barker opinion:
Moreover, "[t]he decision to deny the defendant a
continuance will be disturbed on appeal only upon
a showing that the defendant was prejudiced or
that the result of the trial would likely have
been different had the motion been granted."
State v. Barker, 667 P.2d 108, 114 (Wash. App. 1983)(emphasis added;
citations omitted).
In applying the prejudice analysis to the facts of this
case, the Oliver opinion concludes that Mr. Oliver has failed to
show that the result would have been different had trial counsel
been given time to prepare.

Oliver reasons that trial counsel's

discussions of weaknesses in eyewitness identifications during
Mr. Oliver's testimony, during cross-examination of the State's
witnesses, and during closing argument were adequate; and that the
evidence and information identified by Mr. Oliver on appeal is
merely cumulative to the information presented by trial counsel.
Id. at 5.

This assessment overlooks the nature of eyewitness

identification testimony and the weakness of Mr. Oliver's
credibility.
This case turned on eyewitness identification, which has
been recognized as unreliable, and as a type of evidence that jurors
are prone to believe, despite effective cross-examination and
cautionary instructions.

See State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 488-491

(Utah 1986).
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While Mr. Oliver did briefly mention the previous
misidentification case (wherein he was convicted of a crime he did
not commit on the basis of eyewitness identifications), and while
defense counsel mentioned his testimony during closing argument, the
jurors had reasons to disbelieve Mr. Oliver.

Mr. Oliver admitted to

his criminal conviction involving a forged prescription, which was
apparently a valid criminal conviction involving dishonesty
(T. 149-150).

The jurors were provided testimony that employees of

Adult Probation and Parole suspected Mr. Oliver committed this crime
(T. 116, 124).
Had the jurors seen court documents and evidence concerning
the previous case (in which Mr. Oliver's conviction was based on
eyewitness identification testimony, and which conviction was later
reversed when the true criminals were found), the result likely
would have been different.

II.
THIS COURT SHOULD REASSESS
THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ISSUE
IN LIGHT OF TEMPLIN.
Olivers analysis of the ineffective assistance of counsel
issue again omits the fundamental basis of Mr. Oliver's claim—trial
counsel's admission:
I didn't do any formal trial preparation that I
normally do for a trial such as this, and
consequently, I am not prepared to proceed to
trial.
(T. 4).
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The Oliver opinion indicates that trial counsel's
performance was not deficient because the evidence that trial
counsel did not present was cumulative to evidence that trial
counsel did present.

Oliver at 6.

Because the Oliver opinion

concludes that the failure to present cumulative evidence is not
deficient perfo3rmance, the opinion declines to address whether the
absence of the evidence was prejudicial.

Id.

This assessment overlooks the Tempiin decision, which
recognizes a duty of trial counsel to investigate possible defense
witnesses to bolster a defendant's testimony:

cumulative evidence,

See State v. Tempiin. 805 P.2d 182, 187-188 (Utah 1990).

As in

Tempiin, trial counsel's failure to prepare to support the
defendant's testimony in this case constituted deficient
performance.

See id.

As is demonstrated in the prejudice discussion in Point I
of this petition, supra at 4 through 5, trial counsel's failure to
prepare this case was prejudicial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Oliver requests rehearing of this case.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of October, 1991,

ELIZABETH HOLBR001
Attorney for Petitioner

- 6 -

CERTIFICATION
I, Elizabeth Holbrook, do hereby certify the following:
(1)

I am the attorney for Petitioner in this case;

(2)

This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court

in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case.

ELIZABETH HOLBROOK
\
\

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Elizabeth Holbrook, hereby certify that eight copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 4 00
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies will be delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

'

day of

October, 1991.

''

' i-k

'

i

ELIZABETH HOLBROOK

DELIVERED by
of October, 1991.

this

day

APPENDIX 1
Oliver Opinion

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
——00O00

S t a t e of Utah,
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v.

Case No. 890625-CA
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(September 26, 1991)

Mary T. Noonan
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Third D i s t r i c t , S a l t Lake County
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy
Attorneys:

Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Marian Decker, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Appellant Greg N. Oliver appeals his conviction of burglary, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(1939) and theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1989) on the bases that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a continuance and that admissible
evidence supports only a misdemeanor theft conviction. We affirm
in part, and reverse and remand in part.
BACKGROUND
At 2:30 p.m. on January 7, 1989, John Spielmans returned heme
from a basketball game with his son. He noticed that the side
door to his garage, which was usually locked, was open.
Spielmans went into the garage to investigate. He then saw a man
dressed in a dark cap and dark jacket jump over a chain link
fence ten to twelve feet away and run north. Spielmans began
chasing the man, but lost sight of him. Spielmans returned home
and noticed that the front door to his house was dented and that
it appeared someone had been inside the house. He called 911 and
waited outside for the police to arrive. While he was waiting,
one of Spielmans1s neighbors called his attention to a man who
was leaning against a wooden fence across the street. Noting the
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similarity of that person's clothing to that of the man he had
observed running away, Spielmans concluded it was the same
person. Spielmans walked toward the man, who began running
toward a car parked nearby. The man got into the car and looked
over his left shoulder as Spielmans approached him and said, "It
wasn't me, man" before driving off. Spielmans again called 911
and described the car, including the license plate number and the
direction of travel.
When Deputy Matthews arrived to investigate, Spielmans told
him that a watch, a gold ring, four one-dollar bills and four or
five gold Canadian coins were missing from his house. Deputy
Matthews also spoke with Spielmans1 s neighbor who saw the man run
across his front yard, climb into the parked car and speed away
when Spielmans approached him.
Deputy Matthews ran a computer check on the license plate of
the car and obtained the vehicle owner's name and address. He
then went to the vicinity of that address to investigate further.
He saw a man fitting the description that Spielmans had given,
exit the vehicle owner's residence.
Based on his own observations, the license plate number of the
car and the descriptions given by both Spielmans and his
neighbor, Deputy Matthews obtained a picture of defendant, Greg
N. Oliver, from the police records division. The next day, he
returned to Spielmans's home with the photo of Oliver and showed
it to Spielmans, advising him that he had reason to believe that
Oliver was the same person Spielmans described. Spielmans
identified Oliver as the man he had seen.
Three days after the incident, Deputy Matthews assembled a
photo spread, including the picture of Oliver and pictures of
five other men. He showed the photo spread to Spielmans, who
again identified Oliver as the suspect. Deputy Matthews also
showed the photo spread to three of Spielmans*s neighbors, two of
whom identified Oliver as the person they had observed the day of
the incident.
Oliver was arrested and charged with one count of burglary, a
second degree felony and one count of theft, a third degree
felony.
The trial judge granted two continuances prior to the case
actually being tried. At the final pretrial conference, on
August 28, 1989, Oliver's attorney told the trial judge that he
was ready to proceed to trial and agreed to a trial date of
September 5, 1989.
After the pretrial conference, Oliver entered into plea
negotiations with the State. The trial judge's clerk told both
the State and Oliver's attorney, however, to prepare as if they
890625-CA
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were going to trial as scheduled. The night before trial, Oliver
agreed to the State's plea proposal and decided that he would
enter a guilty plea in the morning rather than go to trial. The
next morning, however, Oliver changed his mind and decided that
he wanted to go to trial. Oliver's attorney moved for a one day
continuance, stating that he needed more time to formally prepare
for trial. The trial judge denied this motion. Oliver was
convicted by a jury of one count of second degree burglary and
one count of third degree theft.
ISSUES
On appeal Oliver argues that: (1) the trial court's denial of
his motion for a continuance denied him due process of law;
(2) the trial court's denial of his motion for a continuance
denied him effective assistance of counsel; and (3) admissible
evidence supports only a class A misdemeanor theft conviction.
ANALYSIS
Due Process
Oliver argues that the trial court's denial of his motion for
a one day continuance violated his right to due process because
it forced his counsel to proceed to trial without being
adequately prepared. Oliver asserts that his attorney did not
conduct any formal trial preparation after Oliver decided to
plead guilty. Consequently, when he changed his mind the next
morning and decided he wanted to go to trial, Oliver's counsel
was not sufficiently prepared. Oliver claims that had his
attorney had one more day to prepare for trial, he would have
been better prepared to: (1) support Oliver's testimony regarding
his prior conviction based on misidentification; (2) expose
weaknesses in the eyewitness identification testimony; and
(3) support Oliver's assertions concerning possible police
misconduct involved in the photo show up.
The grant or denial of a continuance is within the discretion
of the trial court. State v. Humphervs, 707 P. 2d 109, 109 (Utah
1985) (per curiam); State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah
1982); State v. HoosTnan, 542 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah 1975). This
court, will not reverse the trial court's decision absent a clear
abuse of discretion. Id.
When moving for a continuance, a party must show that denial
of the motion will prevent the party from obtaining material and
admissible evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks can
be produced within a reasonable time, and that it has exercised
due diligence in preparing for the case before requesting the
continuance. State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1988).
890625-CA
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Absent such showing, the trial court does not abuse its
discretion if it denies the motion. Id. We are also persuaded
by Washington precedent, that on appeal, the moving party must
show that it was materially prejudiced by the court's denial of
the continuance or that the trial result would have been
different had the continuance been granted. State v. Barker. 667
P.2d 108, 114 (Wash. App. 1983).
Oliver has failed to make the necessary showing required by
these cases. Oliver's counsel did not allege that there were any
witnesses or evidence that he needed to obtain or that would have
been available had the continuance been granted. Nor did he
state specifically what he needed to do, or how or why Oliver
would be prejudiced if he was denied the extra day. Defense
counsel simply requested time to conduct more formal trial
preparation.
Oliver's counsel also failed to demonstrate that he exercised
due diligence before requesting the continuance. Oliver's
attorney represented Oliver at an arrest warrant hearing, the
pretrial conference and throughout plea negotiations with the
State. At the pretrial conference, eight days before trial,
defense counsel told the trial judge that he was prepared to
proceed to trial. After the pretrial, the trial judge instructed
his court clerk to notify both the State and defense counsel
that, although Oliver and the State were engaged in plea
negotiations, they should prepare as if they were going to trial
anyway. The trial judge stated that Oliver was having a hard
time deciding whether or not he would accept the State's plea
bargain and that no one would know until the day of trial whether
or not he would actually enter a plea. In denying the motion,
the trial judge stated:
All counsel, prosecution and defense
counsel were told that given circumstances,
as I understand them, that Mr. Oliver could
not make up his mind, that everyone needed to
proceed, as if we were going to trial, and the
responses we got from the respective offices
of prosecution and defense is that they would
act accordingly.
On appeal, Oliver has failed to show that he was materially
prejudiced by denial of this motion. The trial lasted two days,
instead of only one, as scheduled. Therefore, Oliver's counsel
had the evening of the first day and overnight to further prepare
before the State's case had been fully presented. In essence,
because the trial went two days, Oliver's counsel was afforded
the time to prepare that he requested and which he would have had
if the continuance had been granted. All of the State's
witnesses were subject to recall by defense counsel and the trial
judge found that defense counsel took full advantage of the
890625-CA
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opportunity to cross-examine each of them. Also, because the
motion was denied and the parties had to proceed to trial, one of
the State's witnesses was unable to appear. At the end of the
State's case, the trial judge made the following statement
regarding his denial of Oliver's motion for a continuance:
Each of the witnesses who testified
yesterday it seemed to me, that there was
full availability of cross-examination by
[defense counsel] and he took advantage of
that . . . I want to make sure the record is
very clear that full opportunity had been
made available to the defendant, to the
witnesses . . . and in.fact, since the trial
did not conclude in the first day, that there
has been extra time to prepare, extra time to
do whatever is necessary . . . .
Furthermore, it appears to me that there
may have been some benefit in the sense that
this witness you mentioned, Mrs. Lehaman, is
not available.
Further, Oliver has not shown that the trial result would have
been different had the continuance been granted. The record
shows that Oliver's counsel explored all of the areas Oliver now
complains of. Defense counsel questioned Oliver about his
previous conviction based on eye witness misidentification, and
again brought the prior misidentification to the jury's attention
during closing argument. He cross-examined each eyewitness who
testified and addressed the weaknesses of each person's testimony
at length in his closing argument. Defense counsel also crossexamined Deputy Matthews about his investigation and the photo
show up he conducted with at least one of the eyewitnesses.
Oliver did net tell his attorney that he had decided to plead
guilty until the night before trial. Any formal trial
preparation should have been done before that time. Oliver dees
not show that he was materially prejudiced by the court's denial
of this motion or that the trial would have been different had
the continuance been granted. Therefore, we find that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a
continuance and that such denial did not deprive Oliver of due
process.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Oliver claims that the trial court's denial of his motion for
a one day continuance denied him effective assistance of counsel.
As in his due process argument, Oliver contends that his counsel
was not sufficiently prepared to: (1) support Oliver's testimony
regarding his prior conviction based on misidentification;
890625-CA
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(2) expose weaknesses in the eyewitness identification testimony;
or (3) support Oliver's assertions concerning possible police
misconduct involved in the photo show up. Oliver argues that his
counsel's failure to more fully explore these issues constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 663, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984) , the United States Supreme Courx established a two-part
test for determining whether a criminal defendant's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been
denied. The defendant must show: (1) that his or her counsel's
performance was deficient; and (2) that counsel's performance
prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 637, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. The
defendant must prove both parts of the test in order to prevail.

IdAn attorney's performance is deficient when it falls below the
objective standard of reasonableness. Jd. at 638, 104 S. Ct. at
2064-65; State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State
v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989). The defendant must
point to specific instances in the record which, under the
circumstances, show that counsel's performance was deficient.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; Templin, 805
P.2d at 136; State v. Kovt, 306 P.2d 204, 212 (Utah App. 1991).
In assessing trial counsel's performance, an appellate court
must " 'indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance . . . . '" Templin, 805 P. 2d at 136 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 639, 104 S. Ct. at 2065).
Although Oliver points to three specific areas in which he
claims his counsel should have been more prepared, the record, as
discussed regarding Oliver's due process claims, establishes that
his attorney presented evidence and argument to the jury in all
of these areas. Any additional evidence would have been
cumulative. Oliver has failed to demonstrate how his counsel's
performance was deficient and therefore we need not address
whether Oliver was prejudiced by such performance. We conclude
that Oliver was not denied effective assistance of counsel.
Admissibility of Evidence
Oliver argues that the State failed to introduce admissible
evidence establishing that the value of the stolen property
totalled over $250 as required for a third degree felony theft

890625-CA
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conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(b) (1989)-1
Spielmans reported that a watch, a ring, four one-dollar bills
and four or five Canadian coins were stolen from his home. At
trial, Spielmans testified that the watch was worth one hundred
twenty-five dollars, the four dollar bills were worth four
dollars and that the total value of the coins was approximately
three dollars and seventy-five cents. When questioned about the
ring's value, the following exchange occurred:
Q. [THE PROSECUTOR]: And at the time that the
ring was taken, did you have an opinion as to
the value of that ring?
A. [SPIELMANS]: I did have, and whatever that
opinion was is reflected in the police report.
I don't recall.
Q: You do not recall?
A: No.
Q: Is there anything that would help refresh
your recollection?
A: Nothing other than the police report, I
believe.

Q: I'm asking you if looking at the police
report refreshes your recollection as to the
ring.
A: As to the ring?
Q: As to the ring.

Thank you.

A: I'm sure it reflects what I said.
don't recall.
1.

I just

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (1939) provides:
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this dx*ju=ir
shall be punishable:
. . .

(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is more than
$250 but not more than $1000;

890625-CA
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Q: . . . Having looked at this report, this police
report, does that refresh your recollection
as to how you valued the ring at that time?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. What was the value you placed on that ring
at that time?
A: I really can't recall. It states $200 on there.
That's what I said. If it says $200 on there, that's
what I said.
The police report was not introduced into evidence.
Oliver claims that Spielmans's testimony, based on the police
report, that the ring was worth $200 is inadmissible because
Spielmans lacked personal knowledge of the value and his memory
was not refreshed by the police report. Therefore, Oliver
contends that the State proved a total value of less than $250
for the stolen property, which constitutes a class A misdemeanor
under § 76-6-412(1) (c)2, rather than a felony.
The State argues that the evidence presented is sufficient to
sustain the felony conviction. Before we can assess whether the
evidence is sufficient to support a felony theft conviction, we
must first determine whether the evidence that the ring was worth
$200 was properly admitted, as that evidence is necessary for a
felony conviction.
In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit evidence, we
will not reverse that ruling unless a substantial right of the
party has been affected. State v. Morgan. 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 61,
61 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Salt Lake Citv, v. Koltman. 306*?.2d
235, 237 (Utah App. 1991)); Utah R. Evid. 103(a).
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 602, a witness may only testify
about matters of which the witness has personal knowledge. A
witness may use a writing to refresh his or her memory for the
purpose of testifying. Utah R. Evid. 612(1).

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1) (c) (1939) provides:
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this drsc&r
shall be punishable:
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen was more than $100 but does not
exceed $250;

890625-CA
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It is evident from the trial transcript that Spielmans had no
independent knowledge or memory of the value of the ring, nor was
his memory refreshed after looking at the police report. He had
no present personal knowledge of the ring's value and, therefore,
his testimony concerning the value is inadmissible. We find that
admissible evidence supports only a class A misdemeanor theft
conviction. Therefore, we reverse and remand on the felony theft
conviction issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's
denial of the motion for a continuance, and reverse and remand on
the felony theft conviction for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

<g>»gg*^^
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*

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
WE CONCUR:

l u s s e l i W. Bench, Judge

Noraan K. JacJcson^Judge
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